By Choosing the Moon
Did NASA Choose a Culture?
By choosing
the moon, did visionaries such as President John F. Kennedy unintentionally
choose the culture for NASA? In his 1962 address to the nation, as presented by
O Sallent (2009), Kennedy’s answer to the question as to why the country’s mission
is to go to the moon reveals the prevailing attitude that presented the goal as
a challenge we were not willing to postpone because it was one we as a nation
intended to win in order to become the first nation to successfully launch a
rocket, equipped with all the provisions for survival, and return it to Earth, SAFELY
(emphasis added) (O Sallent, 2009). In the aftermath of the Space
Shuttle Columbia tragedy and after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) concluded “NASA’s history and culture contributed as much to the
Columbia accident as any technical failure”, the space agency sought external
expertise through BST (2004) in order to transform “its organizational and
safety culture” (p. 3).
The final
report, submitted by BST (2004), found that while NASA’s rich, historical
culture includes many positives, such as pride, team spirit, an inheritance of “technical
excellence”, and a “can-do” mindset; its culture and core values were lacking
with regards to walking the walk in areas of safety and communication (p. 3).
Beginning with its top leaders, BST (2004) observed technical expertise was
treasured over upward communication from those who expressed repeated concerns
over safety. Commitment to safety was a talk-the-talk point, an expression of
what NASA says it does; but, it was never woven into the overall fabric of NASA
such that is became an everyday walk-the-walk element (BST, 2004). It is this
report that led Sean O’Keefe, NASA’s Administrator, to address NASA employees.
Imagine for
a moment the sport of NASCAR. Born of a tradition of modifying car engines in
order to out run revenuers, deliver moonshine, and essentially win the race
created by prohibition, their culture parallels that which O’Keefe, as
presented by C-SPAN (2004), describes as “No, because”. Should we not modify
engines, travel at high speeds, conceal highly volatile moonshine, and evade
law enforcement in order to win the race and satisfy the needs of many? Under
the pre-existing culture, the answer would have been, “No, because” we are not
going to allow the government and others dictate whether or not we as a nation
drink alcohol (C-SPAN, 2004). With NASA, the application follows, would we as a
nation choose to not go to the moon? The answer, “No, because” if we do, we
lose the race with the Soviet Union (C-SPAN, 2004). With tragedies in both
NASCAR, the death of Dale Earnhardt, and NASA, many prior to the Columbia, O’Keefe
explains the mindset must become one that says, “Yes, if” (C-SPAN, 2004).
Do we allow
racing to continue given the propensity for drivers to crash into concrete
walls at high rates of speed? “Yes, if” we can construct bumpers that absorb
the impact and avert death. “Yes, if” we can design harnesses meant to prevent
severe damage to a driver’s spinal cord (C-SPAN, 2004). Do we renew NASA’s
mission to “choose to go to the moon” (O Sallent, 2009)? O’Keefe’s address to
the workers of NASA recognizes that past reports sought to view prior issues as
pertaining to specific, different areas of NASA (C-SPAN, 2004). BST (2004)
underscores the challenges the organization faces are much broader in nature
and span the entire agency. “Five guiding principles”: open communication,
rigorously informed judgment, personal responsibility, integrated technical
competence, and individual accountability are necessary to “help define the
desired culture for NASA” (BST, 2004, p. 8). O’Keefe addresses the need for all
employees, beginning with leadership, to demonstrate respect for each other and
each other’s abilities to carry out tasks (C-SPAN, 2004). This failure to
communicate, along with a culture that is “deeply embedded and long-term” (BST,
2004, p. 6), led to group’s wake-up call which O’Keefe recognizes as management’s
need to get out of the way and encourage upward communication such that
historic employee perceptions, ones wherein employees are discouraged from
speaking up, are changed from “No, because” to “Yes, if” (C-SPAN, 2004).
For the
most part, O’Keefe does a tremendous job of conveying the findings of BST and
setting the parameters for the path going forward. Because of the extensive
data collection and interpretation conducted by BST (2004), O’Keefe is equipped
with confirming data that first recognizes the challenges span the entire
organization, there is a path forward with measurable goals to be achieved
within a five month period, and by following the recommendations, O’Keefe is
able to tell employees NASA is “on the cusp of being a truly great organization”
(C-SPAN, 2004). He tells employees all, particularly leadership, will undergo
behavioral assessment, individual action plans, and feedback (C-SPAN, 2004). By
putting the onerous of change on leadership first, he establishes credibility
and believability because BST (2004) and its report reflects employee
sentiments toward leadership. The changes sought will begin with five agencies.
In order for the changes to occur, O’Keefe must present credibility given the
sheer size of NASA and all of its agencies. By looking at the body language of
the employees, it is easy to see many do not believe O’Keefe. Arms are crossed.
Questions asked underscore the concerns of the “mature workforce” with regards
to the “flawed culture” of the younger workforce (C-SPAN, 2004). At one point,
a response by O’Keefe to NASA’s recruiting methods seems rather glib as he
states, “It is what it is” (C-SPAN, 2004).
O’Keefe
notes the importance of treating others the way each would like to be treated.
To me, this is at the heart of the cultural challenges at NASA. As one
questioner posed the situation, there exists an older workforce who have worked
for NASA for decades, are near retirement, and feel the younger workforce does
not carry their same level of dedication (C-SPAN, 2004). This is why O’Keefe
speaks of the many values that need to become a part of NASA’s fabric and
something all can embrace. Ten years have gone by since this report. We launch
satellite rockets. We rely on Russia to transport and transfer astronauts for
the International Space Station. Time will tell, probably if and when another
tragedy occurs, if the changes recommended by BST were completely implemented
and if they made a difference.
References
BST. (2004, March 15).
Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA. In Discussions:
A630.5.3.DQ. My Courses @ Embry-Riddle. Retrieved from
C-SPAN. (2004, April 13). NASA
Cultural Changes. [Video file]. National
Cable Satellite
Corporation. Retrieved
from http://www.c-span.org/video/?181348-1/nasa-cultural- changes%20
O Sallent. (2009, June 27). John
F. Kennedy: “We choose to go to the moon” speech. [Video
file].
Retrieved from https://youtu.be/kwFvJog2dMw
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