Sunday, February 28, 2016

A630.7.4.RB_MedleyKim_Mastering the Art of Change

Mastering the Art of Change
            Mastering the Art of Corporate Reinvention (2000), hosted by Jeff Greenfield, Senior Analyst for CNN, showcases two former chief executives, Gordon Bethune and Michael Bonsignore, of Continental Airlines and Honeywell, respectively. During the discussion, Greenfield describes the situation facing Bonsignore at Honeywell as a “corporate culture dilemma”; however, Bonsignore is quick to dismiss the characterization of “dilemma” and replace it with as a culture facing a “challenge” (Mastering, 2000). In order to understand why this push back from the former chief executive office is important in assessing his time as CEO, one must first look at the two men before they reached the top of the corporate ladder.
            Before soaring to the top of Continental Airlines, Gordon Bethune’s first encounter with planes came with his dad’s crop duster, along with his father’s urging for Bethune to become a pilot, an urging so rejected by Bethune, he literally left home to join the Navy. Bethune dropped out of high school, joined the Navy, later attained his high school diploma, and attended the “Advanced Management Program” at Harvard’s Business School. While in the Navy, the results of his aptitude testing led to more school, which led to a job as an electronics mechanic, which eventually led to a position as the supervisor of the night shift (Mastering, 2000). Here, Bethune learns it is much easier to work with people when they like you and when people are made to feel they are an integral part of the organization, by a leader, it is much easier to lead change (Mastering, 2000). Upon leaving the Navy, his experience of prepping planes for the Navy led him to jobs with Brannon, Western, Piedmont, and Boeing; during which he received his pilot’s license, headed Boeing’s customer service, and headed the divisions for and learned to fly Boeing’s 737 and 757 jets (Mastering, 2000). When he was recruited by Continental Airlines in 1994, he had a diverse background in the airline industry.
            Unlike Bethune, Bonsignore had attending the Naval Academy at Annapolis as his single focus, which he accomplished. He began his career with Honeywell upon his exit from the Navy (Mastering, 2000). Honeywell is a company, originally headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, with a history that spans more than a century (Mastering, 2000). As Bonsignore states, “I’d been with the company for eighteen years before I went to Minnesota for the first time” (Mastering, 2000). He continues, “I was really a product of the colonial part of Honeywell… not terribly steeped in the corporate culture” (Mastering, 2000). Bonsignore’s exodus from Minnesota did not come until Honeywell merged with Allied-Signal in 1999 and moved its operations to Morristown, New Jersey (Mastering, 2000). Bonsignore had been named as Honeywell’s CEO in 1993 and kept his title and position through the merger (Mastering, 2000). By the year 2000, Bonsignore had been with Honeywell for thirty years (Mastering, 2000). The way in which each man approached the challenge of change differs just as uniquely as do their backgrounds.
            By viewing the introductory videos for each CEO, Greenfield is able to demonstrate how each man approached change. Bethune, as noted by the narration, works the crowd at George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, whether cameras are rolling or not, as if he was “running for governor” (Mastering, 2000). He is seen engaging with both customers and employees, while offering words of encouragement for a job well done. Bonsignore observes one of Bethune’s greatest strengths is his “candor”, his ability for being able to present the “unvarnished truth” (Mastering, 2000). Given Bethune was faced with what Greenfield characterized as an opportunity that should have been met with “deepest sympathies” rather than congratulations, it can be argued this strength is what allowed Bethune to, within a year’s time, take a $200 million loss and a company “on the verge of bankruptcy” and transform it “from worst to first” (Mastering, 2000).
            By contrast, Bonsignore’s introductory video portrays him as a CEO returning to his old neighborhood and seeking to “regain the golden touch” that allowed him to transform the original Honeywell during the early 1990s (Mastering, 2000). He has given $5 million as “seed money” for a housing project, Portland Place, designed to improve the “troubled” Phillips Neighborhood of Minneapolis (Mastering, 2000). The personable style of Bethune is noticeable different than the seemingly staged visits, average one to two times per week, of Bonsignore. Portland Place homes feature traditional Honeywell products like thermostats and alarm systems; but, the newly merged company is now described as a “diversified industrial conglomerate” with 40% of its business devoted to commercial aerospace and 40% of its revenues realized through service contracts (Mastering, 2000). Whereas Bethune wants to listen to what the public wants and then set about giving them just that; Bonsignore’s main priority is “global expansion” (Mastering, 2000). Bethune seeks to facilitate change by giving employees buy in. He allowed the men and women who prep the planes to have input with airline scheduling. Each time Continental hit its well-articulated goals of being first in customer service categories, employees were rewarded $100; and, still awarded $65 if second place was reached (Mastering, 2000). Perfect attendance was even rewarded through twice a year drawings for a new Ford Explorer (Mastering, 2000). Bonsignore, when asked by Greenfield, how he dealt with the workers during the Bendix Brakes recall and how the workers felt, avoids the question and turns the discussion to public safety and technological talk regarding how the brakes failed (Mastering, 2000). Bethune’s management philosophy is clear, “Happy employees do a better job for the customer which in turn boosts the bottom line” (Mastering, 2000). Perhaps this is why Bonsignore, after one year post merging and maintaining his position as CEO, is still charting a course for change while Bethune has realized a complete turnaround and is experiencing profits (Mastering, 2000).
            Bonsignore believes he has set clear goals: delighted customers, profitable growth, and leadership and control; yet, these are subjective at best. Unfortunately, these are the goals from which the Bonsignore’s “Day One” decree flowed, “The new Honeywell will not be, not be, a derivative of the old Honeywell or old Allied-Signal” (Mastering, 2000). As he continues, he states, “We will compensate and reward employees who look for the best practices from both to create a new culture and we will punish those who don’t” (Mastering, 2000). Later, Professor Alan Lynn asks how each inspires trust and loyalty with their workers and whether or not rewarding employees was more important or if building a sense of team work was preferred (Mastering, 2000). Bethune’s answer is passionate and likens the interconnection of rewards and team building to that of asking “Who’s in the huddle?” at a football game (Mastering, 2000). Bonsignore responds in a corporate, calculating manner; and, while he states rewards and teams go together, his actions belie his words.
            By the summer of 2000, Honeywell’s lofty growth predictions failed for two quarters. When asked by Greenfield, Bonsignore admits Honeywell had been “caught up in merger mania and all the euphoria associated with bringing two companies together” (Mastering, 2000). They had underestimated the task of completing the integration of Honeywell and Allied-Signal, a $26 billion merger (Mastering, 2000). When Bethune is asked to assess Bonsignore, he states Bonsignore “exudes confidence”, knows what drives the business, and possesses incredible organizational abilities; qualities which assure things are done right and which define a manager, not a leader (Mastering, 2000). Bethune, as CEO of Continental, is one of Honeywell’s largest customers and sits on the board of Honeywell. He used quantitative expectations and measurable so his employees had a clear understanding of how to get from point A to point B; Bonsignore’s goals were subjective at best (Mastering, 2000).
            Brown (2011) lists: advocates of change, degree of change, time frame, impact on culture, and evaluation of change as factors that must be considered in order for change, necessary for survival, to succeed. The degree of change at Honeywell was extreme. The move from Minnesota to New Jersey impacted 11,000 workers. An edict was given to a company with history than spans more than a century; it would not be a derivative of its former self, neither would resemble Allied-Signal. What was the image for the new culture? Bonsignore asks employees to identify best practices; yet, guidelines for doing so are scant; however, punishment is promised for those who fail. Bonsignore observes Honeywell had taken its “success for granted” and that it needed a “kick in the pants”; however, he later admits the merger and the projected earnings per share predictions were “over ambitious”, a failure to communicate took place, and three weeks lapsed before reasons were presented to Wall Street as to why Honeywell missed its predicted revenues (Mastering, 2000). Honeywell lacked a clear vision, a climate favorable for change, effective communications, a positive rewards system, participation of its workers, and leadership from its CEO who seemed more concerned with change and how it benefited him, personally, and less concerned with his growing difficulty in speaking the language of Honeywell’s programmers and who was fast approaching the “Jurassic Park” period of ten years he himself had set as a tenure for CEOs (Mastering, 2000). It is with little wonder and amazement a quick Google search returns the predictable change for Honeywell along with a subsequent article by Gilpin (2001); Bonsignore resigns.



References
Brown, D.R. (2011). An Experiential Approach to Organization Development. (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Gilpin, K.N. (2001, July 4). Honeywell Regroups as Chief Resigns. In Business The New York        Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/04/business/honeywell-  regroups-as-chief-resigns.html

Mastering the art of corporate reinvention [Video file]. (2000). In Films On Demand. Retrieved        February 28, 2016, from fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID=-1&xtid=30238

Sunday, February 21, 2016

A630.6.4.RB_MedleyKim_A Tribe of Local Santas

A Tribe of Local Santas
            It began with an image of a mother and her two children, one prominently displayed by Christmas Come True (2015), sitting outside a local business, baby stroller parked, and holding three cardboard signs that read, “Homeless, God Bless, Homeless, Please Help, and God Bless”. It has grown to into a movement that, according to Observer Staff (2015), has helped more than “96 families, with 295 children” benefit from and enjoy a “Christmas dinner, new clothing, gifts, and Christmas stockings filled with personal hygiene items”. Seth Godin, in his presentation before TED2009 (2009), defines tribes as those who lead and connect people and ideas. Nadine King, Christmas Come True’s tribal leader, saw “a piece of the status quo” (TED2009, 2009) in Flagler County, wherein the “average income for over 5,600 Flagler County residents” fell below $21,000 and the annual poverty rate of $23,050, and decided to make a change by leading (Christmas Come True, 2015). What if she had adopted excuses rather than “finding true believers” in order to start and expand her movement (TED2009, 2009)?

            Watkins’ (2011) presentation looks at “50 Reason Not to Change!”. The concept of change is imagined as a process wherein a door of imagination, once unlocked, opens to a “land of both shadows and substance of things and ideas you just crossed over” only to reach “The Twilight Zone” (Watkins, 2011). Excuses such as: “too much trouble”, “it can’t be done”, it’s impossible” , and “it’s not my job” are but a few King could have easily adopted and moved on with her life while simply observing the plethora of cardboard signs held by the homeless that span the populous of Flagler County (Watkins, 2011). We’ve all had those moments. An immediate “I can’t” comes to mind. I learned early, from my grandmother, an old Southern saying, “can’t never could do anything except stick in the mud and holler for help”. I used to ponder its meaning; but, now, I understand and have so for years. The late Jiddu Krishnamurti queries what keeps us, as humans, from change (as cited in Watkins, 2011). Citing that which will happen if we fail to change, becoming nationalistic, tribal, insular, isolated, without relationships, and constant warring; Krishnamurti observes it is either our superficiality, our immediate need to have our satisfactions met, or a simple lack of caring that prevents us from change (Watkins, 2011). Yet, he concludes that “life is one global unity movement” (as cited in Watkins, 2011); and, this explains Godin’s tribal theory (TED2009, 2009).

            As Godin observes, making change by leading means the leader cannot abide by the status quo (TED2009, 2009). King states because she had seen “so many families suffer”, she decided to upset the status quo of simply nodding and walking by families holding cardboard signs by connecting retailers and services in order to lead a movement that has reached more than “484 families (with 1373 children)” in a short span of just seven years (Christmas Come True, 2015). She didn’t need the entire community to bring about change. She accomplishes her achievements through volunteers of “true believers” who are “not forced” ; but, “want to connect” with others in order to address the needs of families in her community (TED2009, 2009). Like King, the word “No” has become less and less a part of my own vocabulary. "Why" has taken its place, particularly when change is resisted. Why is it too much trouble? Why can't it be done? Why is it impossible? Why is it not my job? Asking why accomplishes so much more than saying "No". Overcoming any negative begins by replacing the negative with a positive. No we shouldn’t, becomes Yes, we can. When this attitude is adopted rather than resisted, we find we haven’t crossed into the Twilight Zone; rather we have a road that allows us to challenge, create a culture, connect, and commit to a movement that brings something as simple as Christmas Come True into the lives of many.



References
Christmas Come True. (2015). Our Christmas Giving Project. Retrieved from
            http://christmascometrue.org/
Observer Staff. (2015, Oct. 28). Flagler residents and businesses help Christmas Come
            True shine During Make a Difference Day. Palm Coast Observer. Retrieved
TED2009. (2009, Feb.). Seth Godin: The tribes we lead. [Video file]. Retrieved from
Watkins, D. (2011, Aug. 24). 50 Reasons Not to Change!. [Video file]. Retrieved from


Monday, February 15, 2016

A630.5.4.RB_MedleyKim_By Choosing the Moon Did NASA Choose a Culture?

By Choosing the Moon Did NASA Choose a Culture?

            By choosing the moon, did visionaries such as President John F. Kennedy unintentionally choose the culture for NASA? In his 1962 address to the nation, as presented by O Sallent (2009), Kennedy’s answer to the question as to why the country’s mission is to go to the moon reveals the prevailing attitude that presented the goal as a challenge we were not willing to postpone because it was one we as a nation intended to win in order to become the first nation to successfully launch a rocket, equipped with all the provisions for survival, and return it to Earth, SAFELY (emphasis added) (O Sallent, 2009). In the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and after the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded “NASA’s history and culture contributed as much to the Columbia accident as any technical failure”, the space agency sought external expertise through BST (2004) in order to transform “its organizational and safety culture” (p. 3).

            The final report, submitted by BST (2004), found that while NASA’s rich, historical culture includes many positives, such as pride, team spirit, an inheritance of “technical excellence”, and a “can-do” mindset; its culture and core values were lacking with regards to walking the walk in areas of safety and communication (p. 3). Beginning with its top leaders, BST (2004) observed technical expertise was treasured over upward communication from those who expressed repeated concerns over safety. Commitment to safety was a talk-the-talk point, an expression of what NASA says it does; but, it was never woven into the overall fabric of NASA such that is became an everyday walk-the-walk element (BST, 2004). It is this report that led Sean O’Keefe, NASA’s Administrator, to address NASA employees.

            Imagine for a moment the sport of NASCAR. Born of a tradition of modifying car engines in order to out run revenuers, deliver moonshine, and essentially win the race created by prohibition, their culture parallels that which O’Keefe, as presented by C-SPAN (2004), describes as “No, because”. Should we not modify engines, travel at high speeds, conceal highly volatile moonshine, and evade law enforcement in order to win the race and satisfy the needs of many? Under the pre-existing culture, the answer would have been, “No, because” we are not going to allow the government and others dictate whether or not we as a nation drink alcohol (C-SPAN, 2004). With NASA, the application follows, would we as a nation choose to not go to the moon? The answer, “No, because” if we do, we lose the race with the Soviet Union (C-SPAN, 2004). With tragedies in both NASCAR, the death of Dale Earnhardt, and NASA, many prior to the Columbia, O’Keefe explains the mindset must become one that says, “Yes, if” (C-SPAN, 2004).

            Do we allow racing to continue given the propensity for drivers to crash into concrete walls at high rates of speed? “Yes, if” we can construct bumpers that absorb the impact and avert death. “Yes, if” we can design harnesses meant to prevent severe damage to a driver’s spinal cord (C-SPAN, 2004). Do we renew NASA’s mission to “choose to go to the moon” (O Sallent, 2009)? O’Keefe’s address to the workers of NASA recognizes that past reports sought to view prior issues as pertaining to specific, different areas of NASA (C-SPAN, 2004). BST (2004) underscores the challenges the organization faces are much broader in nature and span the entire agency. “Five guiding principles”: open communication, rigorously informed judgment, personal responsibility, integrated technical competence, and individual accountability are necessary to “help define the desired culture for NASA” (BST, 2004, p. 8). O’Keefe addresses the need for all employees, beginning with leadership, to demonstrate respect for each other and each other’s abilities to carry out tasks (C-SPAN, 2004). This failure to communicate, along with a culture that is “deeply embedded and long-term” (BST, 2004, p. 6), led to group’s wake-up call which O’Keefe recognizes as management’s need to get out of the way and encourage upward communication such that historic employee perceptions, ones wherein employees are discouraged from speaking up, are changed from “No, because” to “Yes, if” (C-SPAN, 2004).

            For the most part, O’Keefe does a tremendous job of conveying the findings of BST and setting the parameters for the path going forward. Because of the extensive data collection and interpretation conducted by BST (2004), O’Keefe is equipped with confirming data that first recognizes the challenges span the entire organization, there is a path forward with measurable goals to be achieved within a five month period, and by following the recommendations, O’Keefe is able to tell employees NASA is “on the cusp of being a truly great organization” (C-SPAN, 2004). He tells employees all, particularly leadership, will undergo behavioral assessment, individual action plans, and feedback (C-SPAN, 2004). By putting the onerous of change on leadership first, he establishes credibility and believability because BST (2004) and its report reflects employee sentiments toward leadership. The changes sought will begin with five agencies. In order for the changes to occur, O’Keefe must present credibility given the sheer size of NASA and all of its agencies. By looking at the body language of the employees, it is easy to see many do not believe O’Keefe. Arms are crossed. Questions asked underscore the concerns of the “mature workforce” with regards to the “flawed culture” of the younger workforce (C-SPAN, 2004). At one point, a response by O’Keefe to NASA’s recruiting methods seems rather glib as he states, “It is what it is” (C-SPAN, 2004).

            O’Keefe notes the importance of treating others the way each would like to be treated. To me, this is at the heart of the cultural challenges at NASA. As one questioner posed the situation, there exists an older workforce who have worked for NASA for decades, are near retirement, and feel the younger workforce does not carry their same level of dedication (C-SPAN, 2004). This is why O’Keefe speaks of the many values that need to become a part of NASA’s fabric and something all can embrace. Ten years have gone by since this report. We launch satellite rockets. We rely on Russia to transport and transfer astronauts for the International Space Station. Time will tell, probably if and when another tragedy occurs, if the changes recommended by BST were completely implemented and if they made a difference.

  
References
BST. (2004, March 15). Assessment and Plan for Organizational Culture Change at NASA. In        Discussions: A630.5.3.DQ. My Courses @ Embry-Riddle. Retrieved from
C-SPAN. (2004, April 13). NASA Cultural Changes. [Video file]. National Cable Satellite
O Sallent. (2009, June 27). John F. Kennedy: “We choose to go to the moon” speech. [Video
            file]. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/kwFvJog2dMw



Sunday, February 7, 2016

A630.4.4.RB_MedleyKim_Projecting Our Values Through Our Decisions

Projecting Our Values Through Our Decisions
            In a presentation hosted by TEDx Talks (2014), Dr. Joe Arvai, Professor and Svare Chair at the University of Calgary, specializing in Applied Decision Research, discusses certain truths with regards to decision making; one of which is as human beings, we are defined by our skeletons, our cells, tissues, and organs…; but, as people, we are defined by the decisions we make or do not make. Arvai displays a slide of a picture in which nine dolphins are hidden. Upon closer examination, this student of organizational decision making found eight of the nine. The hidden dolphins represent that which we as decision makers often miss, “the bigger picture” (TEDx Talks, 2014). The hidden dolphins are symbolic of our hidden values. Often, decision making is like a mirror that reflects our values outward to the world; but, decision making requires a lens that takes our values, sharpens them, and brings them in to focus such that we are able to make decisions that align with our values (TEDx Talks, 2014). Arvai describes research that confirms most of the decisions we make hit with “50% of our values” and as decisions become more complex and complicated, the alignment of decisions and values further decreases (TEDx Talks, 2014). This observation alludes to another truth; we tend to act as archaeologists, rather than architects, when making decisions (TEDx Talks, 2014).
            Imagine a gasoline station set up much like an international beer bar wherein the gas pumps were labeled as: Canada, United States. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria; and, customers were asked which pump they would select. Depending on one’s home country, we could expect to see our decision making process to follow that of an archaeologist that simply uncovers pre-existing preferences embedded in our minds and we would choose the pump of our home country (TEDx Talks, 2014). However, if consumers are asked to make their decisions based on a reflective process that asks values such as: environmental impact, greenhouse gas emissions, human rights standings, environmental reputation, and the overall price of the gas to determine if the gasoline can qualify as “ethical oil”; the decision making process becomes that of an architect, one who uses current information and knowledge of one’s own values and constructs the best decision, “at the time” that reflects values (TEDx Talks, 2014). At times, the decision making process presented by Arvai can take time. For this, he has developed a decision making “building code” to be used when decisions require a high degree of accuracy and effort (TEDx Talks, 2014). It is this code, which includes: goals and objectives, options, outcomes and consequences, tradeoffs, and monitoring that has led to the research discussed by Marcia Blenko (TEDx Talks, 2014).
            In an interview conducted by the Harvard Business Review (HBR) (2010), Blenko presents research results from studies conducted with 750 companies that span the “Big Six Market” of the: United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and China. She notes those companies who are able to make and execute better decisions that lead to increased financial performance do so with a “faster metabolism” and a higher rate of “employee engagement” (HBR, 2010). Brown (2011) finds today’s organizations understand engaged employees “are the difference between success and failure” and defines engaged employees as those who have “the ability to make decisions about their work”, are held responsible for the results of those decisions, take ownership for those outcomes, and solve hitches and glitches “on their own” (p. 223). As Blenko observes, “boxes and lines”, found on an antiquated organizational charts, have been replaced by decisions “as the basic unit of organization” and   engaged employees can cut through the imaginary lines and realize they can have an impact across the organization (HBR, 2010). Organizations that are able to make faster decisions are more stimulating to its employees and as a result, decision effectiveness increases which strongly correlates to increased revenues (HBR, 2010).
            Just as Blenko lists four elements that comprise decision effectiveness: quality, speed, yield, and effort; she also notes obstacles to good decision making (HBR, 2010). As companies become more complex, it becomes less clear who does what. Further, employees are often not certain who makes the decision. Getting the right information to the decision makers may be delayed or prevented. Leaders may not debate the issues in advance of making the decision; and, the “right talent” may not be in the position tasked with making the decision (HBR, 2010). Returning to Arvai’s discussion, it seems to this observer, values are missing from Blenko’s list (TEDx Talks, 2014). As Arvai notes, there is “no free lunch” and in order to construct those decisions as an architect would, we need to consider the consequences of our decisions before we make our choices (TEDx Talks, 2014). Arvai concludes with that which is my biggest take away, we should take every decision we make throughout the day, week, month, and year and use that as a way to project our values to our family, community, nation, and the world (TEDx Talks, 2014).



References
Brown, D.R. (2011). An Experiential Approach to Organization Development. (8th ed.). Upper
            Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Harvard Business Review. (2010, Oct. 13). How Companies Can Make Better Decisions, Faster.
            [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbxpg6D4Hk8&feature=player_embedded
TEDx Talks. (2014, Dec. 8). How to make better decisions | Dr. Joe Arvai | TEDxCalgary
            [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQ7SAcFp4so